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I. INTRODUCTION 
Walter Smith, a 33-year-old who was mentally handicapped, died 
tragically while living at a Pennsylvania private group home called 
Greenwich Home for Children, Inc.1 This home is a Community 
Rehabilitation Residential Service where mentally handicapped people 
live and are cared for by professionals. Walter suffered from an eating 
disorder known as food shoveling, where he would shove excessive 
quantities of food in his mouth at one time. In addition, he suffered from 
a hypoactive gag reflex which made him abnormally susceptible to 
choking. For these reasons, those caring for him needed to take special 
precautions to prevent him from choking. The professionals at Greenwich 
were fully aware of his condition and were trained to feed him 
appropriately. On the day of his death, Walter had been given two peanut 
butter sandwiches cut up into tiny pieces. While his supervisor had 
stepped out, he had shoved all of the pieces into his mouth and began 
choking. Despite efforts to save him, Walter choked to death on the 
sandwich. 
Walter’s parents brought a negligence claim and sought 
compensatory and punitive damages. Imagine a scenario where the jury 
had returned a verdict of gross negligence, but had awarded damages 
consistent with simple negligence rather than with gross negligence. After 
the verdict was read, the jury was dismissed, and all jurors left the 
courtroom before the judge or counsel realized the inconsistent verdict. 
In the scenario where a jury is dismissed after reaching an 
inconsistent verdict, a federal judge has newly adopted authority. In the 
* Maria T. Ciccolini is a J.D. Candidate at The University of Akron School of Law, graduating in
May 2018. The author would like to especially thank Professor Camilla Hrdy for her helpful guidance 
and support in the writing of this Article.  
1. This anecdote has some facts taken from Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children,
Inc., 921 F.2d 4591 (3d Cir. 1990). Other facts are hypothetical and made up by the author. This 
anecdote will continue in Section III of this Article.  
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case of Dietz v. Bouldin, the United States Supreme Court decided that 
federal judges can recall juries to amend the error.2 The judge must be 
certain there is no prejudice to the jury, however, and address four factors 
laid out by the Court.3 
This Article will explore those four factors and will ultimately argue 
for a bright-line rule that balances the risk of prejudice with the burdens 
of granting a whole new trial. This proposed rule is consistent with the 
long-standing principle of not recalling a jury once discharged because 
the risk of prejudice is far too high once the jury disperses and resumes 
their everyday lives. The proposed rule tightens the wide-latitude of 
discretion afforded to federal judges by the Dietz decision. Judicial 
discretion is of course inevitable, but its effects can be dangerous if not 
restrained.4 
Section II of this Article will discuss the long-standing principle 
stemming from the English common law that judges should not recall a 
jury once it has been discharged. It will also explain how this concept 
translated similarly into the American judicial system, and it will provide 
substance on how the federal circuit courts have handled this issue in 
varying ways leading up to Dietz. Section III of this Article will discuss 
the Dietz test, and it will also describe the petitioner’s argument on appeal 
about why the jury should not have been recalled in Dietz. This section 
will also set forth the main argument that the Supreme Court test is 
insufficient to ensure that claimants before the court are granted a fair 
outcome. I will analyze the factors of the Dietz test and apply them to a 
hypothetical case. The hypothetical will show that there is too great of a 
chance that the jury will be prejudiced and that the judge would 
nevertheless use that original jury to amend the verdict. In Section IV a 
new test is then introduced: a bright-line rule that is more fair and keeps 
the sanctity of the jury. It balances the potential risk of prejudice with the 
likely burdens that come with starting a whole new trial with an entirely 
new jury. The presumption should be that a new trial will be granted 
unless the risk of prejudice is less than the burden of starting a new trial. 
Additionally, to assess prejudice, judges should use a jury questionnaire 
to help determine if there was any prejudice. My proposed test will also 
be applied to the same hypothetical case and indicate how it is a better test 
for determining prejudice to prevent partial juries. In this section the issue 
2. 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016). 
3. Id. 
4. Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judging Discretion: Contexts for Understanding the Role of
Judgement, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 948 (2010) (“Discretion . . . can be a slippery and nebulous 
concept.”). 
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of post-trial motions and objections will also be discussed with the 
implications of Dietz. Section V of this Article will summarize the main 
points and encourage the Court to adopt a stricter test than what is set forth 
in Dietz. 
II. THE HISTORIC PRINCIPLE OF NOT RECALLING DISCHARGED JURIES
American jurisprudence relied on the precedent set by the 1600s
English common law that prohibits dismissed juries from being recalled 
to amend their verdict.5 In a case questioning the re-summoning of a 
dismissed jury, the English court held that the same jury cannot be called 
back to try the same case or same issue in the case.6 The English courts 
also originated the concept of sequestering jurors during their 
deliberations so that they could be kept free of prejudice.7 It was such a 
critical component of conducting fair trials that if the judge was leaving 
town and the jury had not yet reached a verdict, the jurors would have to 
stay together and be taken around with the judge to the other circuits until 
they had finished deliberating.8 
A. The Longstanding Principle 
Subsequently, the first American courts to deal with these issues 
expressed the same concerns about alleviating prejudice from juries and 
prohibiting a recall post-discharge. For example, in 1822, the Maine 
Supreme Court held that only a clerical mistake in the verdict could be 
amended by the court itself.9 However, if the mistake was more 
substantial, for instance if the wrong party was awarded damages or if the 
wrong sum was indicated, the only option for the court was to set aside 
the verdict and call for a new trial.10 The option of re-calling the jury was 
never discussed.11 This was similar to an 1842 Ohio Supreme Court 
decision where the trial court allowed a recall of a discharged jury because 
5. Brief for Petitioner at *27, Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016) (No. 15458), 2016 WL 
792077 (citing Loveday’s Case, 8 Coke Rep. 65b, 65b, 77 Eng. Rep. 573 (1608)) [hereinafter Brief 
for Petitioner]. 
6. Id. 
7. BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 375-76 (Wayne Morrison ed., 
2001) (1768). See also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5 (citing Commonwealth v. M’Caul, 3 Va. (1 
Va. Cas.) 271, 305-06 (Va. 1812)) (granting a new trial where strict segregation was not maintained 
even though “there might be and probably was no tampering with any juryman in this case”). 
8. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *28.
9. Little v. Larrabee, 2 Me. 37, 37 (1822). 
10. Id. at 39-40. 
11. Id. at 37-41. 
4
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the jury had written a verdict on only one of the two counts.12 Overruling 
the trial court decision, the court denied the recall of the same jury because 
it would “jeopardize the jealous guards with which the law has surrounded 
jurors, to insure the pure administration of justice, and to protect the 
citizen.”13 The court articulated that there could be no case where the jury 
could make an amendment to the verdict once the jury has been 
discharged.14 The same decision was made in 1836 by the General Court 
of Virginia when a new trial was granted when a mistake was made, 
despite the fact that only one juror had physically left the courthouse.15 In 
fact, the juror had only gone about 50 yards or so and was even 
accompanied by a sheriff.16 Even then, the court would not approve of the 
verdict being changed by that original discharged jury.17 
The judiciary has also dealt with the issue in the modern era, and 
several jurisdictions have ruled in favor of not reconvening a discharged 
jury.18 The Supreme Court of Arkansas ruled on this issue in 2002 when 
it overturned a trial court’s decision to recall a discharged jury.19 The 
state’s highest court held that jurors may only amend verdicts prior to 
being discharged because at that time they still have the power to do so 
and are not susceptible to any prejudice.20 Though the foreman said the 
jurors had only spoken to each other (and not anyone else) once 
discharged, the court reasoned that the jury could not be reconvened.21 
Only when jurors have stayed as a single body in the presence of the 
courtroom—where not even the appearance of taint can occur—should 
the jury be reconvened.22 
12. Sargent v. State, 11 Ohio 472-74 (1842). 
13. Id. at 474.
14. Id. 
15. Mills v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. 751, 751-52 (1836). 
16. Id.
17. Id. at 752. The discharged jurors actually came back and amended the verdict, but then the 
judge ruled to set aside the verdict. 
18. Moreover, in 2012 the Administration Office of the United States Courts published a
handbook for trial jurors in the district courts to use for their own reference. It tells the jurors that 
once they are dismissed by the judge they can resume their normal daily lives. There is nothing in the 
handbook that discusses the ability of a federal judge to reassemble the jury after being told they are 
free to go. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, HANDBOOK FOR TRIAL JURORS SERVING IN THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, 9-14 (2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/trial-
handbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/WEL7-USZR] 
19. Spears v. Mills, 69 S.W.3d 407, 413 (Ark. 2002). The jury had initially awarded $0 in
damages, and then came back and awarded $5,900. Id. at 410. 
20. Id. at 413. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. See Nails v. S&R, Inc., 639 A.2d 660, 667 (Md. 1994) (holding that the jury in a civil 
case could only amend the verdict due to an inconsistency, ambiguity, or incompleteness up until the 
jury is discharged); see also Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 395 So. 2d 980, 988 (Ala. 1981) 
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Similarly, a few years after Spears, the Supreme Court of Montana 
held that a Montana trial court erred in reconvening a dismissed jury 
because two of the jurors had ex parte communication about the verdict 
with counsel.23 The court further reasoned that juries are to be supervised, 
and that once the jury is dismissed, it is left to its own devices and is too 
free to be brought back and change a verdict.24 
Most importantly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate how 
and when the jury can be instructed, and nowhere in the rules does it allow 
a recall of a discharged jury.25 On the contrary, the rules state that “the 
court may instruct the jury at any time before the jury is discharged.”26 
The plain language indicates that juries cannot be instructed and are to 
return to being ordinary citizens once dismissed by the judge.27 
B. The Circuit Split Preceding Dietz v. Bouldin 
Prior to the Supreme Court decision, there was a slight circuit split 
on the issue of whether judges had the authority to reconvene a discharged 
jury.28 The majority of the circuit courts that had ruled on the decision 
held that judges may recall discharged jurors if, in the totality of the 
circumstances, they were not subjected to outside influences.29 The Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals was the first circuit court to rule on this issue.30 
(holding that the trial court erred in recalling the jury because the jury was discharged and the trial 
judge had retired to its chambers so was not in control of the courtroom when counselor spoke with a 
juror and realized the jury rendered the wrong verdict); People v. Hendricks, 737 P.2d 1350, 1352 
(Cal. 1987). In People v. Hendricks, the court held that it was gross error for the lower court to recall 
a jury that had been discharged for over five months, whether properly or not, because the court had 
lost control over that jury. The court cited People v. Grider, 246 Cal. App. 2d 149 (1966) another case 
where the court had lost control over a jury, only this time the jury had been out of the jury box for a 
mere nine minutes. Hendricks, 737 P.2d at 1359. 
23. Pumphrey v. Empire Lath & Plaster, 135 P.3d 797, 803 (Mont. 2006) (citing Estate of
Spicher v. Miller, 861 P.2d 183, 185 (Mont. 1993)) (“[I]f after being discharged and mingling with 
the public, jurors are permitted to impeach verdicts which they have rendered, it would open the door 
for tampering with jurors and would place it in the power of a dissatisfied or corrupt juror to destroy 
a verdict to which he had deliberately given his assent under sanction of an oath. . . .”). 
24. Id. at 803.
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 51. 
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 51(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
27. Id. 
28. The circuit courts were split in this way on the issue: the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits all agree with a totality of the circumstances approach. On the contrary, the Eighth 
Circuit held that a bright-line rule is necessary. See infra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.  
29. Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016). 
30. Summers v. United States, 11 F.2d 583, 586 (4th Cir. 1926). This decision established an 
exception to the general rule that discharged juries cannot be recalled. The exception allows for a 
recall when the discharged jury still had remained an undispersed unit under the control of the court. 
Id. 
6
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In this 1926 case, the judge had said, “[y]ou are discharged” to the jury; 
however, the court held that just speaking those words was not enough to 
prohibit recalling the jury because the jury was still an “undispersed unit, 
within the control of the court, with no opportunity to mingle with or 
discuss the case with others.”31 Thus, this court gave more meaning to the 
jury’s actual conduct than to the judge’s spoken words ordering 
discharge.32 Similarly, in 1994, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled that a jury was still able to be recalled and polled despite being 
technically discharged.33 The court’s reasoning was that the jury had not 
yet left the courthouse; therefore it could still be controlled by the court.34 
In fact, the jurors were sitting in the jury room alone and untainted by any 
outside sources, waiting to be escorted to the parking lot.35 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision of the Dietz case was 
decided in conjunction with these preceding opinions.36 It agreed with the 
reasoning in the Third Circuit that a momentary release of the jury “did 
not subject them to outside influence.”37 Though the jurors may be 
subjected to outside influences once dismissed, the court reasoned that 
such influence is not guaranteed to occur.38 It added a new layer that the 
other circuit courts before it failed to do—require that the court and 
counsel (if permitted by the court) consider the jury’s actions from the 
time they were dismissed to the time they were recalled.39 The court 
emphasized that this power to recall should be the exception and not the 
rule, “lest the sanctity of untainted jury deliberations be compromised.”40 
31. Id.
32. Id. 
33. United States v. Marinari, 32 F.3d 1209, 1209-15 (7th Cir. 1994). Another issue in this
case was whether or not the case had been made “final.” The court stated there must be a “terminating 
event” that brings to life the judge’s order that the jury is dismissed. The court, echoing similar 
thoughts from the Summers court, see supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text, determined that the 
jury is discharged when they actually separate or disperse, i.e., are no longer a controlled unit. Id. at 
1213-14. 
34. Id. at 1214. 
35. Id. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 2010 came to a similar conclusion that juries
that had been discharged but that had not yet dispersed could be recalled in order to re-read the verdict 
form which was inconsistently read the first time. United States v. Rojas, 617 F.3d 669, 669-79 (2d 
Cir. 2010). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals also decided that a jury that was dismissed and had 
exited the courtroom but that was immediately brought back was an appropriate action of the judge 
because the members did not “interact with any outside individuals, ideas, or coverages of the 
proceedings.” United States v. Figueroa, 683 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 2012). 
36. Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093, 1093-1102 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016). 
37. Figueroa, 683 F.3d at 73. 
38. Dietz, 794 F.3d at 1099. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 1100. 
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The Eighth Circuit is the lone circuit court to hold that there must be 
a bright-line rule determining whether or not judges can recall dismissed 
juries.41 In Wagner v. Jones, the court found that the district judge erred 
in recalling a jury that was discharged after the court declared the case a 
mistrial.42 The court was unaware that the jury had reached a verdict on 
Count I of the claim, and wrongly thought that both Count I and Count II 
were undecided.43 The bright-line rule of this court is that once a jury has 
been dismissed, it “can no longer render, reconsider, amend, or clarify a 
verdict.”44 Not only did the court find that this bright-line rule was more 
aligned with precedent, but the court also found that it actually ensures 
that the verdict is not tainted by outside prejudice.45 Furthermore, the 
court determined that the amorphous rules, such as the rule later 
determined in Dietz, “leaves much to chance.”46 The bright-line rule 
anticipates that jurors are more or less likely to be prejudiced by outside 
influences if the design of the courthouse is structured a certain way and 
if there are many people mingling outside the courtroom.47 The Eighth 
Circuit also noted that the district judge who recalled the jury had not 
made it clear to the jurors why they were being recalled—to rescind the 
mistrial.48 Most importantly, because the jury was discharged, there were 
no instructions given to the jurors  that they could not speak to one another 
or to any other people about the case.49 
Despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit took the same position that the 
majority of the circuit courts had, the ruling of the Eighth Circuit and other 
cases like Wagner (that reject the exception in Summers) shed light on the 
concerns that have now become more serious with the Supreme Court’s 
resolution of the circuit split.50 
41. Wagner v. Jones, 758 F.3d 1030, 1030-37 (8th Cir. 2014). 
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1033. 
44. Id. at 1035. 
45. Id.
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 1035-36. 
48. Id. at 1036. 
49. Id. The court notes that there is a “marked difference between an admonished jury” that 
leaves the courthouse supervision knowing it still has to come back and decide a verdict, and one that 
leaves the courthouse supervision “under the impression that the case is over and their duties 
complete.” Id. at 1035 n.9.  
50. See Mohan v. Exxon Corp., 704 A.2d 1348, 1352 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (“Once 
the jury is beyond the control of the court and relieved from the adherence to and strictures of court 
instruction (in this case for four days), the jury is no longer a functioning entity capable of resurrection 
at the call of a judicial officer.”); see also Pumphrey v. Empire Lath & Plaster, 135 P.3d 797, 804 
(Mont. 2006) (“We adopt the rule that a jury lacks any authority to revisit, alter or amend its verdict—
including via juror polling—after the trial court has discharged the jurors and any of them have left 
8
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III. DIETZ V. BOULDIN AND THE PREJUDICE TEST FOR DECIDING TO
RECALL A DISCHARGED JURY 
A. The Facts of the Case 
The state court case that made its way to the highest court in the 
country involves a typical driving accident.51 Rocky Dietz brought this 
case against Hillary Bouldin to recover for injuries sustained in a car 
collision.52 The district court stipulated to damages of $10,136 for Dietz’s 
medical expenses.53 The only issue for the jury was deciding if Dietz 
should recover more than the stipulated amount of $10,136.54 While the 
jury was deliberating, the jury asked the judge about Dietz’s medical bills 
via a note.55 The jurors wanted to know if the bills had been paid and, if 
so, who had paid them.56 Because of the previous stipulation, the judge 
responded that the jury question was irrelevant, misleading the jury to 
award $0 in damages.57 Before the judge could realize the legally incorrect 
verdict, the jury was dismissed and all of the members had left the 
courtroom.58 
All of the jurors had remained in the building lingering in the 
hallways, with the exception of one who had left the building but had not 
gone too far.59 Once the clerk had gathered all of the jurors and the 
petitioner had objected, the judge recalled the jury and brought them back 
into the courtroom. The judge questioned the jurors as a group, asking 
them collectively whether or not they had spoken to anyone in the 
interim.60 The judge was certain after the questioning that there was no 
prejudice because the jurors unanimously stated they had not spoken to 
anyone about the case.61 The jury was instructed to come back the next 
day, where it awarded Dietz $15,000 in damages, amending the previous 
the presence, control and supervision of the court.”); Melton v. Commonwealth, 111 S.E. 291, 294 
(Va. 1922) (“When the court announces [jurors] discharge, and they leave the presence of the court, 
their functions as jurors have ended, and neither with nor without the consent of the court can they 
amend or alter their verdict. The sanctity of jury trials cannot be thus subjected to the hazard of 
suspicion.”).  
51. Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016). 
52. Id. at 1888. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id.
58. Id. 
59. Id.
60. Id. 
61. Id.
9
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final verdict of $0.62 After the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court 
decision, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the case and applied 
standards of inherent authority bestowed to judges.63 The Court reviewed 
the requirements of inherent authority and affirmed that recalling a 
dismissed jury was part of federal judges’ authority; it held that the lower 
court had not abused its discretion.64 First, the Court found that recalling 
a dismissed jury to correct an error in the verdict is a reasonable response 
to a problem.65 Secondly, the Court determined that there was not any 
other rule or statute preventing the court from creating this new power.66 
Lastly, the Court noted that the inherent power must be “carefully 
circumscribed” so that a jury is not wrongfully prejudiced.67 
B.  The New Precedent Set by Dietz v. Bouldin 
The Court expressed four factors that district court judges need to 
use to determine whether or not a dismissed jury can be fairly recalled to 
change the verdict.68 The first factor the Court created as part of its 
prejudice test is the length of delay between the discharge and the recall.69 
According to the Court, the jury is more likely to be prejudiced the longer 
they have been away from the court’s instruction.70 The Court, however, 
leaves the federal court judges with the decision of deciding exactly how 
long is too long.71 The second factor the Court discussed was whether or 
not the jurors had talked to anyone about the case since being away from 
the court and from their juror duties.72 The Court suggests that even 
seemingly insignificant comments from people who watched the trial 
could be enough to prejudice a juror.73 The third factor the Court analyzed 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 1889. 
65. Id. at 1888. The Court uses standards from two of its prior decisions, noting that district
courts have the power to “manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious 
disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). It also applied the standard 
from Degen v. United States that an inherent power must be “a reasonable response to the problems 
and needs” of the court’s requirement to uphold justice and that it cannot contradict an express 
limitation required by statute. 517 U.S. 820, 823-25 (1996).  
66. Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1889. The Court did not find a limitation in FED. R. CIV. P. 51(b)(3) or 
in any other rules regarding post-verdict remedies. Id. 
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1894-95. 
69. Id. at 1894. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
10
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was whether or not the jury was exposed to any reactions upon rendering 
the verdict, either while they were still in the courtroom or while they 
were walking throughout the courthouse.74 Lastly, the Court requires that 
federal judges ask the jurors about their smartphone or Internet access 
after dismissal.75 The Court realizes, though without giving it enough 
weight, that people check their phones quite often and that prejudice can 
come quickly if jurors accessed their phones at all post-discharge.76 Upon 
applying all of these factors, the Court upheld the Ninth Circuit’s and the 
district court’s decision to recall the jury in this case because it was not 
wrongly influenced and could still fairly serve its duty.77 
C.  The Petitioner’s Arguments 
The petitioner’s argument is strict—recalling is prohibited. The two 
broad arguments supporting this stance are as follows: (1) a federal court 
lacks the inherent authority to recall discharged jurors; and (2) a bright-
line rule against recalling discharged jurors appropriately addresses issues 
of fairness and finality.78 
1. Lack of Authority Argument
The petitioner argued that there are no rules in civil procedure 
regarding such inherent authority and that there is a fundamental principle 
that jurors go back to their normal daily lives once discharged. The most 
applicable rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(b)(3), states that a jury 
can be instructed by the court before it is discharged.79 Of note, there is 
not an option for a district court to reopen a case to change the verdict 
after the jury is discharged.80 
Furthermore, once jurors are discharged, they “return to being an 
ordinary citizen,” and the court is powerless to give more instruction to 
them.81 While serving as jurors, they lose some of their individual 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 1895. 
76. Id. (“Prejudice can come through a whisper or a byte.”).
77. Id. at 1897 (“Federal district courts have a limited inherent power to . . . recall a jury in a
civil case. District courts should exercise this power cautiously and courts of appeals should review 
its invocation carefully.”). 
78. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *7-21. 
79. Id. at *10-12. 
80. Id. at *16. This is similar to FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) as well as FED. R. CRIM. P. 33, which
both do not explicitly allow a dismissed jury to be recalled by a district court. Id. It is also similar to 
FED. R. CIV. P. 48(c) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(d) which state that counsel’s request to poll the jury 
terminates once the jury is discharged. Id. 
81. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *18. 
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freedoms and are asked to follow specific instructions, such as to not 
access press coverage and to avoid discussions with people about the 
case.82 However, as soon as the jury is discharged by the court, the 
“protective shield” is removed and the jurors are free to use their 
smartphones, hold conversations, watch the news, and reconsider their 
decisions made in the deliberating room.83 
The petitioner also argues that none of the three steps that decide if 
a district court has this inherent authority have been met in this case.84 The 
first step questions whether a relevant statute or rule overrides judges’ 
alleged inherent power,85 and as previously stated, Civil Rule 51 (b)(3) 
directly conflicts with judges’ power to recall juries post-discharge.86 The 
court then must consider whether there is any evidence of a special history 
of recalling discharged jurors.87 I discussed earlier in this Article that there 
is a history of judges not reconvening a discharged jury, per the bright-
line rule.88 Lastly, the court must determine that if there is a history of this 
alleged power to recall, by assessing whether it is “necessary to the 
exercise” of the federal court’s powers and whether it is sufficiently 
“limited by the necessity giving rise to its exercise.”89 Without this ability 
to recall, however, judges can still exercise all of their powers, such as 
managing their own dockets and ordering new trials.90 
2. Bright-Line Rule Argument
The petitioner argued that a bright-line rule prohibiting the recall of 
discharged jurors promotes better assurance of fairness and protects the 
“sanctity of jury verdicts.”91 Not only may jurors be prejudiced by others 
82. Id. at *19. 
83. Id. at *8. See also Capital Cities Media, Inc v. Toole, 463 U.S. 1303, 1306 (1983) (“Any 
interest in shielding jurors from pressure [that occurs] during the course of the trial becomes 
attenuated after the jury brings in its verdict and is discharged.”). 
84. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *13. 
85. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996) (“In many instances the inherent powers 
of the courts may be controlled or overridden by statute or rule.”). 
86. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *23 (“Recalling discharged jurors for further service
in a case would ‘circumvent or conflict with’ a variety of civil and criminal rules constricting a federal 
court’s authority upon discharge.”). 
87. Id. (“There is no ‘long unquestioned’ history of courts recalling discharged jurors for
further service in a case.”). 
88. See supra notes 5-27 and accompanying text.
89. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *23. 
90. Id. at *31-32. (“Even absent the power to recall discharged jurors, existing rules already
provide ample procedures for remedying an invalid or ambiguous verdict after the jury has been 
discharged: most notably, a new trial.”). 
91. Id. at *36. 
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while discharged, but jurors may change their minds once outside of the 
deliberation room and after the verdict is rendered.92 Jurors may re-think 
their decisions by “merely having additional time to reflect.”93 Finality is 
also promoted by a bright-line rule prohibiting this authority for federal 
judges because there will be less re-opening of cases.94 The justification 
for allowing the recall of discharged jurors—that it is more cost-effective 
than starting a new trial—is not enough to outweigh the more important 
issues. Both issues of fairness and finality are essential to keeping a jury 
trial a sacrosanct right. 
IV. REPLACING THE TEST FROM DIETZ
A. Dietz’s Prejudice Test Allows Too Much Judicial Discretion 
The Supreme Court’s new prejudice test does not afford enough 
protection to ensure that dismissed juries are not changing verdicts in 
unfair ways post-recall. The judges have far too much lee-way in deciding 
whether or not a case should be given a new trial or whether or not the 
jury should be recalled to correct the error in the verdict. Imagine if the 
hypothetical facts below had occurred in the Walter Smith case discussed 
at the beginning of this Article where the jury’s verdict was legally 
inconsistent. Using this new Supreme Court test, how would a judge 
decide what to do? 
Upon the jury’s dismissal, the jurors had all left the courtroom. While 
juror number one was mingling in the hallway just outside the courtroom, 
she noticed a spectator who had sat through the entire trial walk out of the 
courtroom with tears streaming down her face. Juror number two had 
coincidentally made eye contact with Mrs. Smith, Walter’s mother, as she 
walked by her at the conclusion of the trial. Mrs. Smith mouthed the words 
“shame on you” to the juror. After leaving the courthouse, before driving 
home, juror number three texted his wife and said “heading home, we 
awarded him the right amount of money.” As the juror was driving his 
wife responds, “I’m sure you did the right thing.” Juror number four went 
straight home after the trial and searched the Internet for the victim’s 
obituary, which he found. Juror number five was on the sidewalk near the 
courthouse waiting for the bus when he did a search on his phone for the 
92. Id. at *34. 
93. Id. at *35. See Wagner v. Jones, 758 F.3d 1030, 1036 (8th Cir. 2014) (“We hesitate to give 
a vacillating juror an opportunity to reconsider, after he or she has already been polled and discharged, 
especially where there is the possibility that the jury, or some of its members, may have been confused 
in the understanding of the instructions.”). 
94. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *38. 
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defendant Greenwich’s website. Jurors numbers six and seven had a brief 
discussion about the case and made comments that they were both glad it 
was over. Juror number eight took to Facebook upon arriving home and 
posted that she was done with her civic duty and felt good about the jury’s 
decision.95 In only an hour’s time, she had several comments left on her 
post from her friends. Because of a busy docket, the judge could not recall 
this exact jury until three days later where the jurors were back to amend 
the flawed verdict. Assume no other conversations, Internet searches, or 
social media posts occurred by these or any other jurors. 
1. First Factor—Length of Delay Between Discharge and Recall
The Supreme Court noted that the longer the jury has been dismissed, 
the more likely there will be prejudice because jurors will likely forget 
key facts from the case and may overlook the importance of the jury’s 
role.96 The only specific reference to the length of delay that the Court 
mentions is stating that the dismissal could possibly last just a few 
minutes, as it did in that case.97 In the hypothetical scenario presented 
above, the dismissed jury went about their lives for three whole days 
before they were asked to report back to the courthouse to decide issues 
on the same case. In that amount of time, the jurors could be exposed to 
varying amounts of prejudice, from a comment made by a friend to an 
article on the Internet reporting about how the case turned out. In the 
Court’s test, the other factors may give reasons for a new trial if such 
exposure occurred. Yet, this time factor alone would not be reason enough 
to say that the jury should not be recalled. 
If in Walter Smith’s case the jurors came back after three days and 
all stated that they did not talk to anyone about the case, did not search the 
Internet, and did not witness any emotional outcries in the courtroom, then 
they would be able to sit back in the juror box and change the verdict. 
Even without experiencing any outside influences, the jurors could still 
simply change their minds within those three days.98 During that time 
away from the case and away from the instruction of the court, the jurors’ 
95. See United States v. Liu, 69 F. Supp. 3d 374, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (denying a new trial,
although a juror had posted general comments on Twitter about the case but had not included anything 
regarding the substance of the case). 
96. Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1894 (2016) (“In taking off their juror ‘hats’ and 
returning to their lives, they may lose sight of the vital collective role they played in the impartial 
administration of justice.”). 
97. Id.; see also People v. Grider, 246 Cal. App. 2d 149, 149 (1966) (deciding that nine minutes 
was too long for the jury to have been dismissed and then recalled).  
98. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *34. 
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own reflections can affect them; they could very likely ruminate about 
their decision in the case and suddenly change their mind or rethink why 
they casted their vote the way they had.99 Therefore, the Supreme Court 
should have given a specific time frame for how long would be too long 
for a jury to be discharged and still come back to amend a verdict. Not 
knowing where the line will be crossed affords judges too much discretion 
in assuming prejudice has not occurred while the jury has been discharged 
for any amount of time. 
2. Second Factor—Conversing About the Case
The Supreme Court gave more yet still inadequate guidance in 
stating its second factor of the prejudice test, which asks whether the 
jurors had spoken to anyone about the case post-discharge.100 The Court 
lists a number of people whom could potentially speak to the jury and taint 
them, including press, spouses, and witnesses.101 This list, however, is not 
exhaustive, leaving the possibilities seemingly endless for what kind of 
person and in what context someone could have an effect on a discharged 
juror.102 The Court further provides that even “innocuous comments” 
about the case, such as saying “job well done,” could constitute prejudice 
in this scenario.103 
The Court does not make it explicitly clear, however, how the federal 
court judge making this decision should characterize the question when 
asking the jury. It is extremely easy to see how a judge deciding whether 
to utilize this power to recall a jury could ask this question to the jury 
hastily and without much description. For example, the transcription 
could look something like this: 
Judge: Now, in this time that you’ve been let go from your duties as a 
juror, did you speak to anyone about the case? 
Foreperson: No, your Honor. No one in the jury spoke to anyone after 
discharge. 
99. Id. at *23; see Gugliotta v. Morano, 829 N.E.2d 757, 764 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (deciding 
whether or not to recall a dismissed jury, the judge polled each juror asking if there was a potential 
for prejudice, and one juror stated that her “emotional state had changed when the judge told the jury 
it was dismissed”). 
100.  Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1894. 
 101.  Id. Other people the Court mentions are court staff, attorneys, litigants, sketch artists, and 
friends.  
102.  Id. The Court lists people who could prejudice the jury and then says “and so on,” 
indicating that it foresees the impossibility of limiting the type of prejudice that could occur. Id. 
103.  Id.  
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Through this quick dialogue, it would be easy for a juror to not realize that 
a comment such as in the example above, “job well done,” is considered 
a prejudicial conversation, according to the rule set out by the Supreme 
Court. Only a very astute juror would, before answering, ask the very 
necessary question: “What type of comments or conversation constitutes 
having spoken to someone about the case?” In most cases, if the judge 
does not make it clear that even brief comments in passing could have 
prejudicial effects, the jury itself will not presume that they do. 
Outside conversation also means that prior to the case ending the 
jurors are not to discuss the case amongst themselves.104 Typical jury 
instructions include a segment on how the jurors may not talk to each other 
about the case until the end and unless every juror is present and no one 
else is.105 In this new scenario of recalling a discharged jury, clearly the 
jurors have already spoken to each other about the case because the verdict 
was rendered. However, post-discharge, the jurors are free to speak to 
each other outside of the entire jury’s presence, so the Supreme Court’s 
factor asking whether jurors had spoken to anyone should also include the 
other juror members themselves. Upon being dismissed and away from 
the court’s instruction, jurors will likely talk amongst themselves about 
the case. Yet again, assuming that the judge will ask this specific question 
is assuming too much. At the time of polling, the judge may simply forget 
to ask if they spoke to each other or could refuse to ask this question 
specifically to keep the trial moving.106 
In the hypothetical case of Walter Smith, there are four jurors who 
had technically spoken to another individual about the case. The Supreme 
Court’s factor test, however, will not expose all of these conversations so 
 104.  HANDBOOK FOR TRIAL JURORS SERVING IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, supra 
note 18 (“Jurors should not discuss the case even among themselves until it is concluded.”). 
 105.  See MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT, MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
courts.mi.gov/Courts/MichiganSupremeCourt/mcji/Documents/Model%20Civil%20Jury%20Instruc
tions.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7KJ-J3XL] (last visited Jan. 18, 2017). The court has the choice to read 
Alternative A, which allows the jurors to speak to each other during the trial’s recess so long as they 
follow the rest of the rules, or Alternative B, which states: 
Before you are sent to the jury room to decide the case, you are not to discuss the case 
even with the other members of the jury. This is to ensure that all of you are able to par-
ticipate in all of the discussions about the case, and so that you do not begin to express 
opinions about the case until it has been submitted to you for deliberation.  
Id. at 2-11; see also ILLINOIS COURTS, GENERAL CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS 2, 
http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/Circuitcourt/civilJuryInstructions/IL_IPI_Civil.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8G4R-LTXZ] (last visited Jan. 18, 2017); see also NEW JERSEY COURTS, NEW 
JERSEY MODEL CIVIL JURY CHARGES, https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/civil/civindx.html 
[https://perma.cc/5CGK-NERZ] (last visited Jan. 18, 2017). 
 106.  See infra notes 159-161 and accompanying text regarding judges feeling pressured to clear 
their dockets. 
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that they are addressed and contemplated as part of the judge’s decision 
to recall. Juror number two may not be thinking that a conversation took 
place when Mrs. Smith looked at her and mouthed “shame on you.” For 
the juror to mention this, the judge would likely need to clarify that even 
such innocuous comments are considered conversation. Juror number 
three who texted his wife about the outcome may not have thought of that 
as a conversation since he was simply telling his wife what happened but 
did not discuss the details of the case. Lastly, jurors number six and seven 
may not tell the judge about their conversation because, without the judge 
specifically asking, they may assume that conversations amongst jurors 
did not amount to prejudice and were acceptable, especially considering 
they have already all deliberated together. These problematic issues would 
be avoided if the Supreme Court had required judges to be very specific 
when asking questions about conversations jurors had during the time they 
were discharged. The importance of this question must not be lost on the 
jurors; thus, it must not be lost on the judges, either. 
3. Third Factor—Exposure to Emotional Reactions
The third factor that federal judges must consider in their decisions 
to recall a discharged jury is whether or not the jury was exposed to any 
reactions post-verdict in the courtroom or corridors of the courthouse.107 
This rule recognizes that if jurors witness emotional outcries, cheers, 
gasps, or the like, they can begin to reconsider their decisions.108 This type 
of individual, discrete reconsideration is exactly what the Court is trying 
to avoid through the new prejudice test. This particular factor is extremely 
relevant, for “[a]ny judge who has sat with juries knows that in spite of 
forms [juries] are extremely likely to be impregnated by the environing 
atmosphere.”109 This particular factor is extremely important because of 
the fact that spectators can easily affect juries, whether it is unintentional 
or intentional.110 
107.  Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1894. 
108.  Id. 
109.  Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the 
holding that the rejection of the application for a writ of habeas corpus be affirmed because the jury’s 
decision was affected by the spectators packing the court, by a mob surrounding the court outside, 
and by the judge conferring with the police chief in the presence of the jury, amongst other issues of 
prejudice to the jury). 
110.  See id.  
When we find the judgment of the expert on the spot, of the judge whose business it was 
to preserve not only form, but substance to have been that if one juryman yielded to the 
reasonable doubt that he himself later expressed in court as the result of most anxious 
deliberation, neither prisoner nor counsel would be safe from the rage of the crowd, we 
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This factor issued by the Supreme Court does not address exactly 
how the judge asks the jury if it has witnessed any emotional reactions. 
This creates a double-edge sword: If the judge asks a blanket question 
whether the jurors have witnessed such emotional responses, they may not 
know what that entails and thus not disclose everything necessary. Yet, if 
the judge happened to witness a response of some kind and asks the jury 
about that specific reaction, then the jurors may all become prejudiced 
even without witnessing the scene or hearing the emotional response 
because the judge informed them of it. For example, a judge in Georgia 
may have accidentally prejudiced the jury by asking if while deliberating 
any of them witnessed a gathering outside the window in the jury’s 
sight.111 A man had tied a noose in a rope and waved it in the jury’s 
view.112 The majority of the jurors responded that they had not witnessed 
it, but now it creates a dilemma since they are aware that such conduct 
occurred.113 
Such emotional reactions are more likely to occur in criminal cases 
where defendants are facing prison sentences and more severe charges.114 
In cases where spectators’ “demonstrations” made during the trial have 
led the court to decide whether a new trial, mistrial, or reversal of a 
criminal conviction should be granted, courts have looked at several 
factors including the length and nature of demonstrations, as well as the 
number of demonstrators.115 For example, a Louisiana court granted a new 
trial when, during the defense attorney’s closing argument for a murder 
trial, a woman ran her finger under her throat.116 Four of the jurors had 
witnessed the gesture and told the court that they were not affected by it, 
but the court reasoned that a juror is not competent to show “how that 
think the presumption overwhelming that the jury responded to the passions of the mob. 
Id. 
111.  Douglass v. State, 110 S.E. 168, 172-73 (Ga. 1921).  
112.  Id.  
113.  Id. at 173. (“The slightest demonstration within the view and comprehension of the jury 
may have been sufficient to turn the delicate scale of justice, so evenly balanced as it seems to have 
been during the deliberations of the jury.”). 
 114.  Disruptive Conduct of Spectators in Presence of Jury During Criminal Trial as Basis for 
Reversal, New Trial, or Mistrial—Gestures, Passive Demonstrations, and the Like, 3 A.L.R.7th Art. 
3 (2015). Trial spectators’ conduct affects jurors in criminal cases because “the defendant may feel 
that the jury has been unfairly influenced when attendees shake fists or glare at him or her or at 
witnesses, hug or otherwise comfort the victim, or wear clothing or emblems or hold up signs 
memorializing the victim.” Id. 
 115.  Id. Other factors include: “whether the defendant was acquitted of more serious charges, 
the strength of the evidence of guilt, whether counsel objected to, or the trial court noted, the first 
instance of misconduct, the identity of the demonstrating spectator. . . .” Id. 
116.  State v. Henry, 198 So. 910, 921 (La. 1940). 
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influence operated on his mind.”117 Another court offered cautionary 
instruction to a jury that similarly witnessed spectators’ facial expressions 
and gestures indicating disapproval of the defense counsel’s closing 
argument.118 That jury also witnessed the victim’s mother stand, put her 
hands over her head, and direct applause toward defense counsel.119 These 
examples are clear instances where the jury was prejudiced during a 
criminal trial. 
However, similar reactions could likely occur in a civil case, such as 
in the hypothetical case of Walter Smith. Juror number one was exposed 
to an emotional reaction while he was standing in the corridor of the 
courthouse and witnessed a spectator leave the courtroom crying. The 
judge should be “reluctant”120 to bring back a discharged jury if it has 
witnessed reactions to the verdict, but a particular judge may not find a 
few tears to be considered prejudicial emotion at the cost of ordering a 
whole new trial. Again, there is too much discretion given to judges 
regarding this factor. Perhaps this judge has witnessed much more 
prejudicial types of reactions in the pastsuch as a spectator coming at 
the defendant with a chair in the courtroomso that discrete crying 
witnessed by only one juror seems insubstantial in comparison.121 Such 
comparison should not be a factor in this judge’s analysis of whether 
jurors were affected by spectators’ emotions, but the Dietz test affords 
federal judges so much latitude that it is possible. 
Furthermore, juror number one in Walter’s case may declare to the 
judge that her decision will not be affected by witnessing the woman 
crying, but that raises the question of whether anyone can really know 
how observing such emotions will weigh on one’s ability to make 
decisions based on the law.122 If judges rely on the Dietz test, they could 
possibly taint the jurors accidentally, or they could wrongly ensure that 
jurors have not witnessed any emotional reactions, despite that every 
117.  Id. at 922.   
118.  State v. Weinberg, 575 A.2d 1003 (Conn. 1990). 
119.  Id.; see also State v. Stewart, 295 S.E.2d 627, 630 (S.C. 1982) (reversing a judgment for 
conviction of murder because there were several fits of laughter from spectators and because one juror 
reported that a spectator had been glaring at her with “obvious disgust” and had made opinionated 
remarks overheard by other jury members); Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing 
the denial of habeas corpus relief when the court noticed spectators with buttons that read “Women 
Against Rape” inside the courtroom for a trial on kidnapping and sexual intercourse without consent). 
 120.  Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1894-95 (2016) (explaining that witnessing emotional 
reactions can cause jurors to ask themselves “‘Did I make the right call?’”). 
 121.  Collier v. State, 42 S.E. 226 (Ga. 1902) (explaining that the husband of a prosecuting 
witness in a rape case went after the defendant with a chair and approximately 200 people got up on 
seats to view the defendant). 
122.  See supra notes 116 and 117 and accompanying text.  
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claimant’s basic rights afford him a fair day in court. The Dietz test does 
not ensure that jurors will understand if they have witnessed a prejudicial 
reaction, nor does it ensure that they will come forward with the 
information as they should. 
4. Fourth Factor—Access to Smartphones and Internet
Last in the Court’s four-factor prejudice test is the factor regarding 
jurors’ use of their smartphones and the Internet.123 Texting one’s spouse 
about the case and using Google to research about the evidence in the case 
are examples of how a juror could be prejudiced in this way.124 The key 
to this factor seems to be relevance. If jurors texted something to their 
spouses or used the Internet to search something that had nothing to do 
with the case, then such use is likely acceptable. The problem arises when 
a juror uses a phone or the Internet to interact with others, post on social 
media, or research something relevant to the case. Like all parts of the 
Dietz test, the question is how much prejudice is too much prejudice. 
Researching aspects of the case and posting on social media are 
grounds for jury misconduct, and courts have remedied such cases of 
misconduct by granting new trials. For example, new trials were granted 
because of the following juror misconduct: posting on Facebook during 
the trial and deliberations about having to look at horrible photos;125 
becoming friends with the victim’s mother on Facebook and writing her 
comments about what she wished would have happened with the 
verdict;126 and researching deferred compensation rules which were 
material to ten separate counts the defendant was facing.127 A conviction 
was reversed in another case where a juror expressed on Twitter the 
difficulty in making decisions.128 These types of juror misconduct easily 
cause problems with the present issue. If a judge is to recall a discharged 
jury, the judge should verify that while discharged no jurors posted 
content regarding the case, researched information related to the case, or 
texted/talked about the case. However, the precedent now set in Dietz does 
 123.  Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1895 (“It is a now-ingrained instinct to check our phones whenever 
possible.”). 
 124.  Id. (“Immediately after discharge, a juror could text something about the case to a spouse, 
research an aspect of the evidence on Google, or read reactions to a verdict on Twitter.”). 
125.  United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014). 
126.  State v. Webster, No. 131095, 2014 WL 5861967, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). 
127.  United States v. LaRoque, No. 4:12CR881H, 2014 WL 683729, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 20, 
2014). 
 128.  Dimas-Martinez v. State, 385 S.W. 3d 238, 246-48 (Ark. 2011). The juror had tweeted on 
Twitter: “Choices to be made. Hearts to be broken. We each define the great line.” Id. 
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not require that jurors be individually polled.129 The Dietz test also does 
not include references to other types of research conducted without using 
the Internet, such as research from a dictionary or a library reference book. 
In the hypothetical case of Walter Smith, three jurors’ Internet and 
social media uses under the Dietz test would likely bring about 
inconsistent analyses of prejudice. Both jurors four and five used the 
Internet for related material: the victim’s obituary and the defendant 
company’s website. Under the Dietz test, two judges may look at those 
facts and come to differing opinions because there is no barometer for 
what the Court was attempting to make precedent. Is an obituary 
prejudicial? Does researching the company website matter if what the 
juror found had already been discussed at trial? Additionally, juror 
number eight’s comment on Facebook may be deemed prejudicial to some 
judges, while others may view it as simply a general comment not 
amounting to any level of prejudice.130 Judges making this decision would 
be left to use their own personal opinions about what constitutes a 
comment or research that is related to the case. The inconsistencies would 
be great. Without an individual jury poll, judges would never obtain the 
information necessary to make an accurate decision about whether the 
social media or outside resources jurors used was so influential as to 
amount to prejudice. 
B. Solution—Implement A Balancing Test 
Dietz is a step in the right direction because this power afforded to 
judges prevents cases from being retried for mistakes that could be easily 
fixed with the same jury. It is no secret that not having a new trial saves 
both parties time, money, and the distress of not gaining closure sooner, 
not to mention that is prevents court congestion. In fact, the situation in 
Dietz is in many ways the perfect scenario for when judges should recall 
a discharged jury.131 However, the guidelines now left to federal judges 
from this case are hardly guidelines at all; it is difficult for judges to know 
exactly when to recall juries and when to grant new trials. The Court 
should instead adopt a more streamlined test that asks judges to consider 
the risk of prejudice against the burden of a new trial. To enhance fairness 
to each claimant, if there is a clear mistake with the verdict, the 
 129.  Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1896-97 (“While individual questioning could be the better practice in 
many circumstances, Dietz’s attorney raised no objection to this part of the court’s process. We 
decline to review this forfeited objection.”). Individual questioning is suggested but not required. 
 130.  See United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 298 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that a juror’s 
Facebook post commenting about the case was harmless and did not rise to the level of prejudice). 
131.  See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text regarding the facts of Dietz. 
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presumption should be that a new trial will be granted unless the risk of 
prejudice is less than the burden of starting a new trial with an entirely 
new jury. As opposed to the large discrepancies that could happen using 
the Supreme Court’s test, this test will still enable judges to use their own 
discretion, but it tightens the amount of latitude and allows for more 
consistency. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence has a similar balancing test for 
deciding whether or not to exclude relevant evidence.132 Rule 403 
balances the evidence’s probative value with the possible dangers of 
bringing in the evidence, such as unfair prejudice, jury confusion, and 
wasting time.133 If one of the dangers substantially outweighs the 
probative value, the court may exclude the evidence that is otherwise 
relevant. This kind of balancing act is exactly what is needed for the 
present issue because it still allows for judicial discretion, but it offers an 
actual test to consult, not just mere guidelines. 
1. Proposed Test—A Deeper Look at the Risk of Prejudice
a. Jury Questionnaire
Practically speaking, a federal judge looking to recall a jury post-
verdict should ask about instances of prejudice to each juror before 
allowing the same jury to sit again on the case.134 Rather than asking these 
questions to the jury collectively, the judge should issue a type of written 
jury questionnaire to each juror to complete individually without 
discussion with other jurors. The questionnaire can therefore ask more 
specific questions and give examples of the kind of prejudice that may 
have occurred while they were discharged. This way, judges will not have 
to make examples on the spot of how prejudice can occur, and the form 
can be consistently used by each judge in the jurisdiction. There will be 
more consistency in these types of judicial decisions regarding recall, and 
these forms will better document what informed the judge’s decision for 
record-keeping purposes if the case is appealed. 
 132.  FED. R. EVID. 403. “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the 
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” 
Id. 
133.  Id. 
 134.  See Dietz v Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093-1102 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016) 
(requiring that the court poll the jurors upon being recalled); see also supra notes 39-40 and 
accompanying text. 
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This questionnaire would work as a type of jury polling or inquiry so 
that the judges receive the most accurate information from each individual 
juror. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has a similar jury polling 
that must take place upon a party’s request or which the court may issue 
on its own.135 In criminal cases, this polling takes place post-verdict but 
prior to the discharge of the jury, and the purpose of it is to assure that the 
jury made a unanimous decision without any coercion of jurors to agree 
to the verdict.136 Regarding the present issue, judges would issue this 
individual polling via a standard written questionnaire so that jurors are 
not influenced by other jurors’ verbal responses made to the judge.137 
b. Length of Delay—Must Recall within the Same Day of the
Verdict
As previously mentioned, juries have been viewed as a single unit 
made up of individuals who only revert back to their individual mindsets, 
so to speak, once they are dispersed back into society.138 Upon dismissal, 
jurors leave the environment where they rationalized their decision, and 
they leave the people whom they deliberated with about the verdict. It is 
not surprising that the Court fears the longer the jury has been dismissed, 
the more likely it is susceptible to some kind of prejudice.139 For these 
reasons, federal judges should not be able to recall a jury that has been 
discharged for over a day. Only if a mistake was found and the jury could 
be recalled within the same day, noting the hours of the court, can the 
same jury be asked to amend a verdict. If there is no possibility of bringing 
in the same jury on the day that the mistake was made and the verdict read, 
then the judge must automatically award a new trial. 
 135.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(d). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(d) advisory committee’s notes. There 
is no actual language in the rule that requires polling be done individually, but the Committee 
recommends it is. Id. 
136.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(d) advisory committee’s notes. 
 137.  See id. Collective polling of jurors does not save much time and is not adequate in 
determining that a juror has not been coerced by others because there is no certainty that a juror who 
was coerced would speak up as the dissenting voice.  
138.  See Porret v. City of New York, 169 N.E. 208, 208 (N.Y. 1929). Chief Judge Cardozo 
stated that after discharge the jury “has ceased to be a jury, and, if its members happen to come 
together again, they are there as individuals, and no longer as an organized group, an arm or agency 
of the law.” Id. 
139.  See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
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c. Conversation
A question that must be asked as part of the jury questionnaire, and 
which is in line with the Dietz prejudice test, is whether or not the jury 
members spoke to anyone about the case post-verdict.140 It must be 
specific and include examples such as spouses, bailiffs, friends, spectators 
of the trial, and even other jurors if spoken to outside of the jury as a 
whole. The question must also define “conversation” to mean simply any 
communication whatsoever with another person about any aspect of the 
case. The questionnaire would cover this inquiry best if it included the 
Supreme Court’s description that even innocuous comments said to a juror 
would count as prejudice.141 The question should be broad enough to 
include conversations made in person, via cell phone, or via social media. 
The questionnaire should include a space for jurors to write exactly what 
was discussed about the case, as well as whom the conversation was with. 
Dietz does not allude to any real significance regarding who actually 
speaks to the juror, just that conversation took place at all. However, it is 
an important aspect when weighing the prejudicial factors against the 
burden of a new trial. Certain comments may be more prejudicial to the 
juror depending on who said it. If only one of the jurors had an 
insignificant conversation with someone about the case, and no other 
issues of prejudice were present at all, then a judge in applying this 
proposed test may decide that the risk of prejudice is less than the burden 
of having a new trial. 
d. Emotional Reactions
The next question posed to each juror via this form should be whether 
or not any juror witnessed emotional outcries or reactions during and after 
the final verdict being read. The term emotional outcries or expressions 
should be defined broadly on the form so that the jurors have a basis for 
what they saw or heard that could have prejudiced them. An example of 
the definition could be: “any reaction, response, or gesture, whether verbal 
or non-verbal, that you witnessed that was in reaction, whether 
simultaneously or not, to the outcome or the procedures of the trial.” The 
question regarding emotional outcries should also be open-ended so that 
jurors could write in any instances that they feel amounted to the court’s 
definition and whether or not it would impact their ability to amend the 
verdict. Though jurors may respond that they would not be affected by 
140.  See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
141.  See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 11
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss3/11
2017] WHEN TO RECALL DISCHARGED JURIES 943 
witnessing varying types of emotions, it should still be the judges’ 
ultimate decision. The judges, when viewing the questionnaires as a 
whole, must decide whether or not the jurors’ witnessing of emotional 
cries amounted to prejudice that would outweigh the burden of a new trial. 
Jurors are not capable of making such decisions on their own as to whether 
they have been prejudiced in this way. Judges should consider certain 
emotional reactions, such as chairs being thrown or clapping and 
hollering, to weigh heavily on the side of prejudice that is enough to 
render a new trial. 
e. Smartphone Access and Use of Extrinsic Evidence
The last component of the jury questionnaire should include 
questions asking whether or not the jurors used their smartphone or 
accessed any extrinsic evidence that is in any way connected to the trial. 
This is an expansion of Dietz, which only references smartphone and 
Internet use. A juror may come across a newspaper headline of the trial or 
use an actual dictionary or other library sources to verify something post-
verdict.142 
The first question should ask whether jurors used their phone to call 
or text, and if so, whether or not the case was discussed in any way. The 
next question should ask whether or not the jurors used social media at 
all, such as Facebook or Twitter, and if so, whether or not they posted any 
information at all relating to the trial or to serving as a juror in the 
particular case. The questionnaire should leave in space for the jurors to 
transcribe verbatim the comments that they posted on social media, as 
well as any follow-up comments that friends left, so that the judge may 
know more quickly rather than having to investigate. If any juror responds 
affirmatively to either of these questions and the information they spoke 
of or posted related to the trial, then judges should be more likely to 
indicate a high-risk of prejudice that is grounds for a new trial.143 Posting 
on social media is more severe because it involves access to more people 
in a shorter amount of time, and the ways the juror could be prejudiced 
 142.  See United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543 (11th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the court 
granted a new trial where a juror used a dictionary to look up terminology while deliberating and had 
also informed other jurors about a newspaper headline she had seen discussing the possible sentencing 
the defendant could receive). 
 143.  Similarly, in criminal cases, if a juror’s third-party communication is related to the case, it 
is critical to determine if it is harmless prejudice or whether it is substantial. See Remmer v. United 
States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) (explaining that conversation is “presumptively prejudicial,” but the 
government has a heavy burden to prove that the harm to the defendant was harmless).   
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from it are seemingly endless.144 Leaving comments about the trial on 
social media “engenders responses that include extraneous information 
about the case, or attempts to exercise persuasion and influence.”145 One 
“like” on a juror’s post about the trial could be enough to prejudice that 
juror because it approved that juror’s conduct or thought-process. 
However, if the comments posted are “harmless ramblings” about 
the case, then it may not rise to a level of prejudice that would warrant a 
new trial when compared to the burdens of starting a new trial.146 For 
example, a juror posted on social media before the verdict was rendered, 
“This is it . . . no looking back now!”; the post was considered 
meaningless and not actual prejudice.147 Because of this, it is critical that 
judges take time to investigate what was exactly posted by jurors on social 
media, as well as any responses posted by friends, to determine if the 
prejudice is severe enough to tip the balancing scales towards ordering a 
new trial. 
The next question on the form should ask if the jurors post-discharge 
used the Internet, whether on their smartphones or otherwise, or any other 
outside documents or books to research information relating to the trial. 
Researching information about the parties, elements of the case, and the 
like should also be given the same bright-line standard, and there should 
be an automatic new trial scheduled rather than letting the same jury 
amend the verdict.148 In these situations, jurors now have outside 
information that could be used to sway their opinions once back inside the 
deliberation room to amend the verdict.149 Just as this is unacceptable 
juror behavior and in violation of the jury instructions at any time during 
a trial, it also should be deemed highly prejudicial if the jurors lawfully 
 144.  See United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 305 (3d Cir. 2011) (“If anything, the risk of such 
prejudicial communication may be greater when a juror comments on a blog or social media website 
than when she has a discussion about the case in person, given that the universe of individuals who 
are able to see and respond to a comment on Facebook or a blog is significantly larger.”).  
145.  Id. 
146.  Id. at 298.  
147.  Id. See also United States v. Villalobos, No. 14-40147, 2015 WL 544898, at *2 (5th Cir. 
2015) (denying a new trial because the comments were vague and not prejudicial—the juror had 
commented about wanting the trial to be over). Compare this to People v. Lozano, where a juror 
posted specific details of the case, such as that the trial she was serving on was a child abuse case that 
happened when the baby was four months old, and that everything weighed on the credibility of the 
witnesses. No. D058370, 2011 WL 6217076 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2011). Still, the court in that case 
did not order a new trial. Id. 
 148.  See United States v. LaRoque, No. 4:12CR881H, 2014 WL 683729, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 
20, 2014). 
 149.  See id. (explaining that the judge had no idea which definition the juror used when making 
his decision on the verdict—the one researched online or the definition and information provided 
from the trial).  
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behaved this way post-discharge, but were later recalled for the same 
case.150 
2. Proposed Test—A Deeper Look at the Burden of a New Trial
a. Types of Burdens
If a judge finds any amount of potential prejudice to the jury, under 
the proposed test the judge will weigh that potential for risk of prejudice 
against the burdens of starting a new trial. The main burdens of starting a 
new trial are, not surprisingly, additional costs to each party, having to 
deal with congested courts, and the inevitable prolonged litigation.151 
Parties want their cases to be over, but by starting a new trial, they have 
to wait even longer for a resolution, which means waiting a long time to 
receive the compensation they likely need immediately.152 Not to mention 
that if the party is a business, the business might be put on hold.153 The 
court also has to spend its own money in helping to manage the case, 
deciding motions for the parties, and other ways in which it is involved in 
the process of starting a new trial.154 Other issues include the effect that 
new trials have on the public’s distrust of and loss of confidence in the 
judicial system.155 The public starts to wonder if the courts operate as 
equitable and timely as they should.156 Furthermore, there is a real 
possibility that in the time that the first case has ceased and the new trial 
 150.  In criminal cases, there have been reversals and remandings due to jury misconduct for 
using outside information. See Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
1035 (1981) (noting that jury members used a medical dictionary to determine aspects that were 
material to the counts); see also United States v. Renteria, 625 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that 
defendant alleged an entire tape recording was given to jury when only portions of the tape were 
actually admitted); United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that the court’s 
official file containing inadmissible evidence had been left in the jury room).  
 151.  See Michael Heise, Justice Delayed? An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition 
Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 814 (2000). See generally George L. Priest, Private Litigation 
and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U.L. REV. 527 (1989).  
 152.  See Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Institutions Prolong 
Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 573 (2013) (citing Nathalie Chappe, Demand for Civil Trials and 
Court Congestion, 33 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 343, 344 (2012)) (“Delays in the resolution of legal disputes 
create a wide variety of social costs: injured parties do not receive compensation when they most need 
it, individuals are deterred from bringing cases, future offences are insufficiently deterred. . . .”). 
153.  See id. 
154.  Id. at 574.  
155.  Heise, supra note 151, at 814-15 (“Delays in the resolution of civil disputes erode public 
confidence in the civil justice system, disappoint and frustrate those seeking compensation through 
the legal system, and generate benefits for those with the financial ability to withstand delays or 
otherwise benefit from them.”). 
156.  Id. 
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begins, evidence has spoiled, witnesses’ memories have faded, and 
witnesses or litigants have died.157 
According to an empirical study performed in 2000, the average civil 
jury case tried in the United States took two and a half years to resolve 
(30.2 months) from the time it was filed to the time the jury trial verdict 
was announced.158 A large factor contributing to this problem is the 
backlog of cases that judges have on their dockets that have accumulated 
over time.159 Thus, in the present situation, federal judges must keep these 
considerations in mind when faced with whether or not to order a new trial 
because they are the ones in charge of their own dockets. The interplay 
between this burden and the risk of prejudice is this: the concerns about 
the burdens of starting a new trial will generally be the same in most 
situations. However, the risk of prejudice is unique to each case and, 
therefore, will need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
b. Judges’ Incentives as Case Managers
Because of all of these aforementioned burdens on the courts, it is 
easy to see the incentive that judges have to use the same jury to amend 
the verdict rather than opt for a new trial altogether. Judges are now acting 
as case managers and have more power than ever to decide each piece of 
the case and the scheduling and timing of it all.160 With this fact that 
judges have the power and the incentives to clear their dockets and keep 
the cases moving, it makes it hard to believe that most judges pressed with 
a decision to recall a discharged jury or start a new trial would consider 
doing the latter.161 Of course, if there is obvious prejudice that occurred 
157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. at 833-36. In the sample conducted in Heise’s study, the most expeditious civil jury 
trials were in Fairfax County, Virginia and took only 17.5 months to complete, while the longest trials 
took over five years in Cook County, Illinois.  
159.  George L. Priest, Private Litigation and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U.L. Rev. 
527, 527 (1989). Referencing the congestion problem articulated from a crucial study by using a 
metaphor of a logjam from the lumber industry:  
Cases flow into a court calendar in the way logs float into a lake. The determinants of the 
size of the logjam at any point are the rate that logs flow into the lake, the rate that logs 
flow out of the lake, and the number of logs stuck in the lake from earlier imbalances in 
the flow. 
Id.  
 160.  Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 
669-74 (2010). Of note, empirical data shows that most attorneys have been satisfied with the case 
management and believe it has benefitted their work. Id. at 687. However, judges involved in case 
management have time taken away from their main job of trying cases. Id. at 694. Case management 
is another “dangerous form of judicial activism.” Id. at 691-92. 
 161.  See id. at 691-93. Judges who are effective case managers are involved in the Rule 16 stage 
and are better able to tailor their cases in the beginning so that they are not overly expensive and 
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to jurors once discharged, judges would likely face accusations of abuse 
of discretion on appeal if they did not opt for a new trial.162 But in those 
cases that are close calls, it would be easy to see how a judge would want 
to save a congested docket and simply bring back the discharged jury. For 
these reasons, the proposed test balancing the two factors is much more 
reliable than the Dietz test. The Supreme Court ignores the reality that 
judges have their own hand and own concerns in cases, so a tightening of 
this discretion is necessary. 
C. Application of the Proposed Balancing Test 
If the proposed test was applied in the hypothetical Walter Smith 
case, then it would automatically be given a new trial. The jury did not 
reconvene to amend the verdict until three days later, and the test proposes 
it must be brought back within one day. For the purpose of this Article, 
however, each juror’s behavior after the discharge will be analyzed under 
the proposed test. 
Juror one’s witness of a spectator crying post-verdict would likely be 
considered prejudicial, but on its own it likely would not be enough to 
outweigh the burden of starting a new trial. Juror two, based on the 
questionnaire, would know that even Mrs. Smith’s comment “shame on 
you” is considered conversation for purposes of the prejudice analyses, 
whereas under the Dietz guidance the juror may not have. The judge 
would likely determine that this is highly prejudicial, especially because 
it was a comment said by the decedent’s mother. That particular comment 
would be perhaps most prejudicial coming from her, rather than any other 
spectator in the courtroom that day. Similarly, juror three will have noted 
on the questionnaire his texts with his wife. The judge will likely find that 
the conversation is highly prejudicial because the wife’s comment is 
validating, which is one of the exact reasons conversations about the trial 
can be dangerous. Jurors four and five would have answered on the 
questionnaire that they had accessed and researched what would now be 
extrinsic evidence if they were to be asked to decide again on the same 
case. These actions alone would be enough for the judge to decide to issue 
a new trial because, under the proposed test, any extrinsic evidence looked 
prolonged. Id. Thus, judges are more involved from the beginning and would not be likely to grant a 
new trial in this new form of discretion offered in recalling discharged juries. If judges are not in 
charge of their own case management and instead give that job to a magistrate, then that judge may 
be criticized for doing so because it violates the “single judge” rule of the Civil Caseflow Management 
Guidelines. Id. at 694-95. 
162.  See Cravens, supra note 4, at 948. 
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into about the case is considered so prejudicial that it is automatic grounds 
for a new trial. 
The conversation between jurors six and seven would be noted on 
the questionnaire since talking to other jurors outside of the deliberation 
room about the case can also amount to prejudice. Here, however, the 
judge would likely determine that general comments about being glad the 
case is over have no actual taint on the jurors. Lastly, juror eight’s 
Facebook comment itself may not rise to the level of prejudice, but since 
there were several comments left by others responding to it, the judge 
would need to inquire about what those comments were and whether the 
juror had read them while discharged. 
The judge deciding whether to recall the jury from Walter Smith’s 
case would have all of this information gathered from the jurors’ 
questionnaires and would then weigh it all against the burdens of starting 
a new trial in that same court. The amount of prejudice in this case would 
have been substantial enough to outweigh the burdens of having a new 
trial, and therefore a new trial should be rendered. Multiple jurors 
experienced prejudice so that the fate of Walter Smith’s case should no 
longer rest in the hands of that very same jury. The costs and lack of 
finality that come with starting a new trial are not ideal for any claimant 
to have to endure, but in this case it would be worth it so that the verdict 
and amount of damages is not unfairly amended. 
D. Post-Verdict Motions and Party Objections 
Another significant aspect that the Supreme Court test fails to 
address is the implication of post-verdict motions and party objections.163 
Because there is no timeline from the decision indicating “how long is too 
long” for the jury to be discharged and still be considered for a recall, 
there is nothing stopping a party from requesting, perhaps days later, that 
the judge re-empanel the jury to fix the flawed verdict. A party negatively 
impacted by the flawed verdict may first try this route rather than file a 
motion for a new trial. Parties have 28 days to file a motion for a new trial 
or for an amendment to the verdict,164 so what is stopping a party from, 
prior to seeking a new trial, taking nearly 28 days to request to recall the 
original jury? Without a strict time-frame issued under Dietz, district 
courts may grant the request and recall the original jurors who would have 
had more than enough time and opportunity to be prejudiced in a number 
163.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *38-39. 
 164.  FED. R. CIV. P. 59(b) & (e). The court can order a new trial by granting a party’s motion, 
or it can grant a new trial for reasons other than what is stated in the party’s own motion. Id. 
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of ways. The balancing test proposed above prohibits this from happening 
because the time-frame to recall the jury is one day only. Other federal 
rules indicate that parties can identify and correct errors, but it must 
happen while the jury is still empaneled.165 
Typically, a party that fails to object to an inconsistent verdict before 
the jury is excused waives its right to make any future objections on the 
verdict.166 The rationale for the rule is that the party did not object when 
it had a chance to have the original jury head back into the deliberation 
room and amend the verdict, or even have the judge further instruct the 
jury. However, under the Dietz test this notion becomes futile. If the judge 
can always re-empanel the same jury whose verdict is inconsistent, then 
objecting is not necessary.167 On the other hand, the party that wins with 
the original verdict may want to object to the recall because it will be 
unfavorable to them; in other words, the party who wins initially may be 
better off with a new trial than with the same jury amending its verdict 
after it has been recalled and received more instruction from the judge.168 
Because the Court’s opinion did not address the impact it will have on 
other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such as Rules 48, 49, 51, and 59, 
 165.  See FED. R. CIV. P. (48)(c) (“After a verdict is returned but before the jury is discharged, 
the court must on a party’s request, or may on its own, poll the jurors individually.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 
51 (b)(3) (“The court may instruct the jury at any time before the jury is discharged.”); FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 30(c) (“The court may instruct the jury before or after the arguments are completed, or at both 
times.”); and FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(d) (“After a verdict is returned but before the jury is discharged, the 
court must on a party’s request, or may on its own, poll the jurors individually.”). 
 166.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 46. Unless the party had no chance to object, the right to object is 
waived: “Failing to object does not prejudice a party who had no opportunity to do so when the ruling 
or order was made.” Id. See Babcock v. General Motors Corp., 299 F.3d 60, 63-67 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(“General Motors has waived any claim that the special verdict form was unacceptable by failing to 
object at a time when I could have taken corrective action; and General Motors has waived any claim 
that the verdicts are inconsistent because I gave it an opportunity to assert such a claim before I 
discharged the jury and it declined to make its argument at a time when I could have taken corrective 
action.”); see also Colonial Refrigerated Transp., Inc. v. Mitchell, 403 F.2d 541, 552 (5th Cir. 1968) 
(“The burden was on the defendants’ counsel to make a timely request that the court properly limit 
the admissibility to the evidence and properly charge the jury with respect to the manner in which it 
was to be considered.”). 
 167.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 46 (Notes & Decisions). There is a further issue here, however, about 
what could happen on appeal in this case if the party did not object to the inconsistent verdict, and the 
judge recalled the jury, and the verdict was not in that party’s favor. Yet, there is still a chance, albeit 
a slim one, that the appellate court may bring an objection sua sponte if none was made by a party.  
 168.  See R. B. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 299 F.2d 753, 760 (5th Cir. 1962) (“When so much of the 
verdict is made up of answers which are not sustained by the evidence and the really critical issue on 
increase of hazard was not submitted to the jury at all . . . the case must be retried.”); see also FED. R. 
CIV. P. 49 (b)(4) (“When the answers are inconsistent with each other and one or more is also 
inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment must not be entered; instead, the court must direct the 
jury to further consider its answers and verdict, or must order a new trial.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 49 (Notes 
& Decisions). 
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the district courts will be left to figure out these dilemmas as they arise. 
The sense of finality for claimants that the Court was defending in its 
opinion is actually a false sense of finality because in reality there will 
likely be more appeals due to this new power afforded to federal judges. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As this Article illustrates, judges are afforded far too much authority 
in the precedent set forth in Dietz. The strategy that may have worked for 
the facts of that particular case should not be set as the standard for all 
federal judges to use when found in a situation of deciding whether to 
recall a discharged jury to amend a flawed verdict. It is far too simplistic 
of a test for it to fit all the various scenarios that could arise during the 
time that the jury is discharged. Once jurors have removed their “juror 
cap,” they are free from the court’s instruction and can act, think, and 
speak as they please. Without stricter guidelines on how judges should 
consider the concept of using the same jury, too many cases will be 
amended by juries that have been prejudiced beyond repair. Issuing jurors 
a questionnaire upon their recall will enhance the effectiveness of the 
judge’s determination of whether or not there was prejudice during the 
time the jury was discharged. By balancing that risk against the burdens 
of starting a new trial in an era plagued with congested courts, the sanctity 
of our judicial system will be preserved and will remain a reliable and 
equitable function of our society as a whole. 
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